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A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to
leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This
myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place
after the ﬁrst move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a farsighted be-
haviour in his deﬁnition of large consistent set (LCS). In some respects, we
propose a different idea of dominance relation based on indirect dominance
and on a different concept of belief on moving coalitions’ behavior. A no-
tion of stability for a coalitional game is introduced by taking into account
the different degree of risk/safety of any player participating in a move.
Some results about uncovered sets, internal stability are investigated. By
exploiting our dominance and stability concepts, the prisoner’s dilemma in
coalitional form and its Nash equilibrium are studied. Some examples il-
lustrating the differences between the largest consistent set, our stable set
and stable set due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) are presented.
1 Preliminaries
Cooperative behaviour often emerges at a group rather than social level. In many
instances we observe the formation of independent and sometime competing groups,
teams, clubs, cooperatives (coalitions for short) each of them persecuting the same goal
(in turn provision of commodities, raising of public funds, standards of behaviour and
so on). Examples of this behaviour are numerous both at micro and macro level: sci-
entiﬁc research groups, university departments, consumers associations, ﬁrms as orga-
nizations, consumption and production cooperatives, industrial districts, international
commercial treatises among countries are all instances of volunteer agreements among
independent parties that coalesce to obtain a same goal. Once coalitions form, society is
partitioned in a coalitional structure. Mathematically speaking, a coalitional game can
be represented in an effectiveness form in such a way
  = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;)
1We want to thank Marta Biancardi for some helpful criticisms and scientiﬁc discussions.
1where
 N is the set of players; a nonempty subset S  N is called coalition.
 Z is the set of all the partitions of N whose elements are disjoint coalitions. Any
element of Z is called outcome or coalition structure;
 i is a strong preference relation deﬁned on Z associated to player i;
 !S is a reﬂexive relation deﬁned on Z associated to S  N.
The family of preference relations figi2N := can be replaced by a value function
V : Z ! RN whose component Vi(a) denotes the payoff obtained by player i if the
coalition structure a is formed. In addition, the family f!SgSN is called effectiveness
relation of the game  . The game is played in the following manner: when the game
begins, there is a status quo outcome, say a. If the members of a coalition S decide
to change the status quo to an outcome b, then the status quo becomes b. This means
a !S b. From this new status quo b, other coalitions might move to c ( i.e. b !T c)
through T and so forth. If the game reaches an outcome from which no coalition moves,
the game ends and this outcome has to be necessarily considered stable. Step by step,
any player i could prefer an outcome to another one by using his preference relation i
or his value function Vi. All actions are public. If a i b for all i 2 S, we write a S b.
We say that a is directly dominated by b, or a < b, if and only if there exists a coalition
S such that a !S b and a S b.
We recall some deﬁnitions. In general, let < be a dominance relation deﬁned on Z
such that for any a;b 2 Z; a < b means that a is dominated by b. Then, the pair (Z;<)
is called an abstract system [17]. A subset V  Z is V-M internally stable set if it is
free of inner contradiction (i.e. there do not exist x;y 2 V such that x < y). A subset
V  Z is V-M externally stable set if it accounts for every alternative that excludes, (i.e.
if x 62 V it must be the case that there exists y 2 V such that x < y). A subset V is a
stable set for (Z;<) if it is externally and internally stable. So, any coalitional game in
effectiveness form with his direct dominance relation < is an abstract system. A good
starting point for predicting possible ﬁnal outcomes is computing V-M internal stable
sets, V-M external stable sets and stable sets with respect to <. But, these solutions do
not incorporate any idea of farsightedness.
Chwe introduces a new dominance relation in a seminal paper.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Chwe, [8]) Let a;b two outcomes in Z. We say that a is indirectly dom-
inated by b, or a  b, if there exist a sequence of outcomes a = a0; a1;::::;am = b
and a sequence of coalitions S0; S1; ::::;Sm 1 such that ai !Si ai+1 and ai Si b for
i = 0;1;2;:::;m   1.
2In such way, an outcome b is said to dominate indirectly another alternative outcome a
if b can replace a in a sequence of moves such that at each move the active coalition
prefers b to the alternative it faces at that stage. The indirect dominance captures the
idea that coalitions can anticipate other coalitions’ actions.
A set Y  Z is consistent if for any d 2 Z, S  N such that a !S d, there exists
e 2 Y where d = e or d  e such that a S e. Roughly speaking, an outcome a
belongs to a consistent set Y if whatever deviation some coalition S could make from
a, S would reach another outcome e 2 Y after some further right deviations; at least,
one deviating player i 2 S is worse off than he is on a. Conversely, an outcome a 62 Y
if there exists at least one coalition S deviating from a such that all the players in S are
better off but not equal at the ﬁrst deviation in y and at every outcomes in Y indirectly
dominating the ﬁrst deviation. If Y is a consistent set and a 2 Y , the interpretation is
not that a is a ﬁnal outcome but that it is possible for a to be a ﬁnal outcome. If an
outcome b 62 Y , the interpretation is that b cannot be a ﬁnal outcome since there is no
consistent story in which b could be so. One of the drawbacks of this idea consists in
having been given recursively. In fact, the subset Y is consistent if for any a 2 Y , one
can ﬁnd out another blocking outcome e 2 Y on which some of the initial deviators
from a are worse off than they are on a. But, in its turn, e 2 Y if there exists another
blocking outcome f 2 Y on which some of the initial deviators from f are worse off
than on e and so forth. Many consistent sets could be in a game in effectiveness form.
But, fortunately, the following uniqueness result holds. If N and Z are ﬁnite sets and
i is irreﬂexive, then LCS( ) 6= ;. In addition, it has the external stability property.
Moreover, it can also be computed in a ﬁnite number of steps by the following iterative
mapping algorithm
 Z1 = f(Z)
 Z2 = f(Z1) = f(f(Z)) = f2(Z)
   
 Zi = f(Zi 1) =
itimes z }| {
(f  f    f)(Z)
then there exists an integer j such that
Zj+1 = Zj 6= ;
(and this happens in a ﬁnite number of steps) then
LCS( ) = Zj
An extension of Chwe’s theorem for an uncountable set of outcomes can be found in
[21]. This idea of consistent stability has some shortcomings.
3Stability of some outcomes could be based on some incredible ﬁnal outcome. Bhat-
tacharya gets rid of this shortcoming in [6]. The central idea is that if a coalition blocks
an outcome by another, then the blocking outcome itself must not be a dominated one.
From any status a, if a coalition conceives of blocking it by moving to another outcome
b, then it must take into account not all possible paths starting from b and ending with
a similar outcome but only ones starting from b and ending with credible outcomes. He
introduces a similar notion of dominance with the additional desirable property of cred-
ibility. Mathematically speaking, we say that an outcome a is credibly dominated by
anotheronebwithrespecttoasubsetY meansthata  bandthereexistsnoc 2 Y such
that b  c. He constructs a credible consistent set and the largest credible consistent
set.
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, in [16], criticize the solution concept of the largest
consistent set that may be too inclusive in some cases. They reﬁne it by assuming that
coalitions should contemplate the possibility to end with a positive probability at any
coalition structure a 2 Z which dominates the ﬁrst deviation d. They called the set
obtained the largest cautious consistent set (LCCS) under this criteria. An outcome a
is stable if whatever some coalition S can deviate from it, it is possible to ﬁnd just an
itself stable outcome after some further right deviations (including the ﬁrst deviation)
on which one player i 2 S deviating is worse off but not equal at least. Conversely, an
outcome is unstable if there exists at least one coalition S deviating from a and for every
stable outcomes coming from any possible right deviation (including the ﬁrst deviation),
all the players in the coalition S are better off or equal.
Another criticism to the largest consistent set is done by Xue in [22]. In fact, an
outcome a is indirectly dominated by b if there are some coalitions encouraged to move
towards the ﬁnal outcome without predicting about the behaviour of the intermediate
coalitions along this path. In fact, indirect dominance does not incorporate any chance
that the intermediate coalitions could decide to deviate toward other outcomes more
proﬁtable than b for them.
Consider a coalitional game in effectiveness form as an oriented graph. The element
ab will be an arc if and only if there exists S  N such that a !S b. We denote by
a all the paths reachable starting from a. A path  2 a will be a subset of outcomes
linked by various arcs starting from a with a terminal node h = t(). We say that a
path  is preferred by player i to  if and only if t() i t(). A standard of behaviour
(SB)  for the situation with perfect foresight is mapping that assigns to every a 2 Z a
subset (a)  a. In this context, we present some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Deﬁnition of OSSB, [22]) A standard behaviour (SB)  for the situa-
tion with perfect foresight is optimistic stable if 8a 2 Z;  2 a n (a) 9b 2 ; S 
N; c 2 Z such that b !S c and 9 2 (c) :  S .
Deﬁnition 1.3 (Deﬁnition of CSSB, [22]) A standard behaviour (SB)  for the situa-
tion with perfect foresight is conservative stable if 8a 2 Z;  2 a n(a) 9b 2 ; S 
4N; c 2 Z such that b !S c and 8 2 (c) :  S .
(b)  fbc; bch; bce; bd; bde; bg Is abch 2 (a)? (h) = fhg
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In the scheme above, our question is abch 2 (a)? Let a be a node on abch, b its
unique deviation and suppose (b) known. If h = t(abch) S t(l) 8l 2 (b), then a
passes the test in conservative sense. If 9l 2 (b) h = t(abch) S t(l), then a passes
the test in optimistic sense. Repeat the same test for any node b; c; h on the path abch
for any deviation starting from these nodes by assuming to know (c), (d), (e) and
(h). If b, c, h pass the previous tests, we can say that the path abch 2 (a). By
repeating this test for the remaining paths in a like a, ab, abc, abce, abd and abde, we
can compute (a)  a. At the same time, we can extend this algorithm on all the
nodes of the graph in diagram above. So, we can compute the values of  on all the
nodes as a mapping satisfying the stability property. But, how can we compute (a) in
the previous graph if we do not know (b)? The technique described above provides a
computable result if we start the computation of  on the terminal nodes of the graph
(i.e. e; h) by coming up along the tree for computing the standard behaviour on the
remaining nodes. In addition, stables outcomes related to an OSSB/CSSB  for the
situation with perfect foresight are given by E = fa 2 Z ja 2 (a)g.
Other kind of static solutions can be found in [4]. An interesting paper [5] imposes
some axiomatic constraints on any idea of stability solution for coalitional games in ef-
fectiveness form. Other kinds of solutions based on an ongoing dynamic process with
payoffs generated as coalition form disintegrate or regroup (PCF equilibrium) [14]. In
this paper, equilibrium PCFs are connected with multiple absorbing states to the largest
consistent set. Another attempt to remedy the shortcomings of existing solution concept
and to identify the conseguences of common knowledge of rationality and farsighted-
ness is in [13]. Herings and others propose to apply exstensive-form rationalizability to
the framework of social enviroments. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes coin-
cides with the set of outcomes which are rationalizable in a ﬁnite well posed multistage
game approaching to an inﬁnite multistage game. They prove that the set of rational-
izable outcomes is nonempty. Equibrium based on binding agreements are studied in a
5seminalpaper[18]inacontextwherethepayofftoeachplayerdependsontheactionsof
all other players. Farsighted behaviour is studied in the setting of hedonic games where
individual’s preferences depend solely on the composition of the coalition they belong
to [9]. Regarding stability set introduced in a seminal paper [19] as a solution of the
voting paradox, Chakravorti, in [7], underlines that the voters are myopic in the sense
that they ignore far-sightedness on the part of others and voters look only one step ahead
and do not consider events arbitrarily far ahead. In [20], relationship between largest
consistent set and stable set in prisoner’s dilemma is studied intensively. They underline
that the two notions produce completely different outcomes in the mixed extension of
prisoner’s dilemma.
In section 2, an overview and some examples on the problem are given. In Section
3, we introduce a new idea of dominance relation called believable-path farsightedness
which includes a backwards induction proceeding whatever any related idea of stability
could predict in terms of ﬁnal outcomes. Then, we introduce some other dominance
relations based on technique. In Section 4, we deﬁne a N-vector  for measuring the
risk/safety degree of an individual player moving in a coalition. According to this ,
we present -stable sets and main -stable sets. In Section 5, we study relationship
between our concept of stability and some V-M stable sets, uncovered sets. In section 6,
weintroducetheprisoner’sdilemmaasagameineffectivenessformintwomainsetting.
Then, we compute the main -stable sets, the largest consistent set and V-M stable sets.
In section 6, some criticisms regarding our deﬁnitions and new future research trends
are presented.
2 An overview on the problem
In some respects, the idea which is far away any doubts is that modelling stability and
farsightedness independently could lead to results which are not comparable one to each
other. Accordingto theaforesaid item, the key pointis to stressdifferences betweenpro-
cesses of rationalizability between players and coalitions and processes trough which
any coalitions can not consider a move from an outcome a convenient move. A coali-
tion moving from an outcome a 2 Z to its immediate deviation thinks that some other
coalitions can move from its ﬁrst deviation to another outcome and so forth; till reach-
ing the ﬁnal outcome b according to Chwe’s deﬁnition. So, S has a farsighted behavior
since it thinks that its ﬁnal outcome is b. But, it is not so farsighted since he thinks that
the intermediate coalitions S0; S1; ;Sm 1 are so myopic to predict b as the unique
possible outcome for them. The deviating coalition S does not think that the interme-
diate coalitions could move according to the same idea of farsightedness used by itself.
Roughly speaking, it thinks that intermediate coalitions are in a such way more myopic
than itself. We can conclude that all the coalitions are farsighted but all the coalitions
thinks that other coalitions are not so myopic but not so farsighted as itself. We give an
6Table 1: Indirect and Direct Dominances
a 6 a b 6 b c 6 c d 6 d e 6 e f 6 f g 6 g
a < b b < c c < d d < e e 6< f f < g g 6 a
a 6 c b 6 d c  e d 6 f e  g f 6 a g 6 b
a 6 d b  e c 6 f d 6 g e 6 a f 6 b g 6 c
a 6 e b 6 f c 6 g d 6 a e 6 b f 6 c g 6 d
a 6 f b 6 g c 6 a d 6 b e 6 c f 6 d g 6 e
a 6 g b 6 a c 6 b d 6 c e 6 d f 6 e g 6 f
example which put in evidence a strange solution prescribed by the largest consistent
set.
Example 2.1 Let f1;2;3g and fa; b; c; d; e; f; gg be three players and the set com-
posed by seven outcomes. Suppose that the game in effectiveness form is described as
in the scheme. Every outcome is identiﬁed with a triple which describes payoff for every


































We show direct and direct dominances in Table 2.
the largest consistent set is fb;d;gg. If player 1 is not farsighted, he should think
that a move from a to b is good since 1 = V1(a) < V1(b) = 3
2. So, for a not farsighted
player 1, a is considered unstable. But, according to Chwe’s indirect dominance, a is
not a possible ﬁnal outcome notwithstanding players are farsighted. In fact, suppose
that player 1 moves from a to b. So c; e are the only outcomes such that b  c; b  e.
But, 1 = V1(a) > V1(c) = 1
2 and 1 = V1(a) > V1(e) = 3
4. We focus our attention on e:
e is not a possible ﬁnal outcome. In fact, suppose that player 1 deviates from e to f. So,
3
4 = V1(e) > V1(f) = 1
2. But, in its turn, f is not a possible ﬁnal outcome since player
2 prefers to move from f to g since 2 = V2(f) < V2(g) = 3. In addition, it is true that
f  g but 3
4 = V1(e) < V1(g) = 4
5. So, e is not be considered a ﬁnal outcome. We
focus our attention on c: e is not a possible ﬁnal outcome. In fact, taking d as the ﬁrst
deviation from c, note that 1
2 = V3(c) < V3(d) = 1; e is the only one such that d  e.
But, e is not a possible ﬁnal outcome as shown above. Finally, a is not a possible ﬁnal
outcome. Roughly speaking, a is unstable. According to this scheme, being so much
farsighted (in Chwe’s meaning) is analogous to be not farsighted at all !!
7Suppose that player 1 is farsighted in a different way. Suppose that he is able to see
one shot-deviation in its turn and predict successive move by the next moving coalition
and so on, by taking into account that he could move again along the game. If player 1
thinks in this simple and common way: ”If I deviate from a to b, player 2 would deviate
from b to c since 1 = V2(b) < V2(c) = 2. Then, coalition f1;3g would deviate from
c to d since 1
2 = V1(c) < V1(d) = 9
8 and 1
2 = V3(c) < V3(d) = 1. Then, player 3
would deviate from d to e since 1 = V3(d) < V3(e) = 2. Then, I should enforce f
notwithstanding I get a loose since player 2 leads me to g since 2 = V2(f) < V2(g) = 3
where I should be better than I am on e. But, g is worst off for me than a, so I prefer to
remain at a.” So, a can be considered stable. According to his belief, player 1 ends in g
which is in the largest consistent set.
Another problem is related to the fact that largest consistent set is hardly related
to a complete pessimistic belief of a moving coalition according to the spirit of social
situations [10]. Let be the following example.
Example 2.2 Let f1;2g and fa; b; c; d;g be two players and the set composed by four














Note that LCS=fa;c;dg. In this case, a is a bit strange solution prescribed by largest
consistent set. In fact, after the ﬁrst deviation from a to b, player 2 can deviate to c or
d. But, both deviations are credible deviations according to Bhattacharia’ s spirit. But,
a 62 (a) with an OSSB . Then, a is not stable according to an optimistic standard
behavior with perfect foresight. But, player 1 has an earn in d enormously greater than
the loose he receives in c. But, an OSSB can fail in putting this optimistic behavior in
evidence as shown in this example.
Example 2.3 Let f1;2g and fa; b; c; d;g be two players and the set composed by four














Note that LCS=fa;c;dg. In this case, a is a bit strange solution prescribed by largest
consistent set. In fact, after the ﬁrst deviation from a to b, player 2 can deviate to c or
d. But, both deviations are credible deviations according to Bhattacharia’ s spirit. But,
a 2 (a) with any  OSSB/CSSB since (b) = ;. Then, a is stable according to any
standard behavior with perfect foresight. But, player 1 continues to have an earn in d
enormously greater than the loose he receives in c.
3 New dominance relations
In this section, we deﬁne our concept of dominance between outcomes on Z by taking
into account shortcomings shown in Example 2.1. The idea is based on backwards
induction along the path joining two outcomes indirectly.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (path-believable farsighted dominance ) Given two outcomes a;b, we
say that a is believable-path dominated by b if and only if there exists a chain of coali-
tions S0;S1 :::Sm 1 and a chain of outcomes a0;a1 :::am such that
a = a0 !S0 a1 !S1 a2 ::::::am 1 !Sm 1 am = b
; 6= Bh  Ph+1 h = 0:::m   1
or
9h 2 f0;:::;m   1g : Bh = ; ) Bh 1  Pk k = h:::m (3.1)
where
B0 = fc 2 Z j b  cg (3.2)
Bh = fc 2 Z j k  c 8k 2 Bh 1g h = 1:::m   1 (3.3)
Ph = fa 2 Z j Vi(a) > Vi(am h) 8i 2 Sm hg h = 1:::m: (3.4)
We denote it by a pbf b:
9Deﬁnition 3.2 (weak path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of
Deﬁnition 3.1, we say that a is weakly believable-path dominated by b if (3.1) is re-
placed by
Bh \ Ph+1 6= ; h = 0:::m   1
or
9h 2 f0;:::;m   1g : Bh = ; ) Bh 1 \ Pk 6= ; k = h:::m:
We denote it by a wpbf b.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (weak path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of
Deﬁnition 3.1, we say that a is weakly* believable-path dominated by b if (3.1), (3.3)
are replaced by
Bh \ Ph+1 6= ; h = 0:::m   1
or
9h 2 f0;:::;m   1g : Bh = ; ) Bh 1 \ Pk 6= ; k = h:::m:
and
Bh = fc 2 Z j k  c 8k 2 Bh 1 \ Phg h = 1:::m   1:
We denote it by a wpbf b.
It is trivial to show that if a pbf b it implies a wpbf b. These dominance relations
can be considered in a more large meaning [16]. But these slight variations does not
involve the backwards-induction spirit of our Deﬁnition 3.1.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Large path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of
Deﬁnition 3.1, we say that a is strictly believable-path dominated by b if (3.4) is re-
placed by
Ph = fa 2 Z j Vi(a)  Vi(am h) 8i 2 Sm h; 9j 2 Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)g h = 1:::m:
We denote it by a lpbf b.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Large weak path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same set-
tings of Deﬁnition 3.1, we say that a is strictly weakly believable-path dominated by b if
(3.1), (3.4) are replaced by
Bh \ Ph+1 6= ; h = 0:::m   1
or
9h 2 f0;:::;m   1g : Bh = ; ) Bh 1 \ Pk 6= ; k = h:::m
Ph = fa 2 Z j Vi(a)  Vi(am h) 8i 2 Sm h; 9j 2 Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)g h = 1:::m:
We denote it by a lwpbf b.
10Deﬁnition 3.6 (Large weak path-believable farsighted dominance) Inthesameset-
tings of Deﬁnition 3.1, we say that a is strictly weakly believable-path dominated by b
if (3.1), (3.3)(3.4) are replaced by
Bh \ Ph+1 6= ; h = 0:::m   1
or
9h 2 f0;:::;m   1g : Bh = ; ) Bh 1 \ Pk 6= ; k = h:::m
Bh = fc 2 Z j k  c 8k 2 Bh 1 \ Phg h = 1:::m   1
Ph = fa 2 Z j Vi(a)  Vi(am h) 8i 2 Sm h; 9j 2 Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)g h = 1:::m:
We denote it by a lwpbf b.
For any a;e 2 Z such that a  e according to the previous deﬁnitions, the set of out-
comes in Bm 1 is denoted by Ba;e. This subset Ba;e is named the set of ﬁnal outcomes.
We can compute PBF, WPBF dominances in Example 2.1. These results are de-
scribed in Tables 2, 3.
Table 2: PBF dominances
a 6pbf a b 6pbf b c 6pbf c d 6pbf d e 6pbf e f 6pbf f g 6pbf g
a 6pbf b b 6pbf c c pbf d d 6pbf e e pbf f f pbf g g 6pbf a
a 6pbf c b pbf d c 6pbf e d 6pbf f e pbf g f 6pbf a g 6pbf b
a 6pbf d b 6pbf e c 6pbf f d 6pbf g e 6pbf a f 6pbf b g 6pbf c
a 6pbf e b 6pbf f c 6pbf g d 6pbf a e 6pbf b f 6pbf c g 6pbf d
a 6pbf f b 6pbf g c 6pbf a d 6pbf b e 6pbf c f 6pbf d g 6pbf e
a 6pbf g b 6pbf a c 6pbf b d 6pbf c e 6pbf d f 6pbf e g 6pbf f
Note that b 6 d since player 2 prefers b to d. But B0 = feg, so coalition f1;3g
prefers e to c. But B1 = fgg, so player 2 prefers g to b. Therefore, b pbf d. At
the same way, note that b  e but b 6pbf e, a < b but a 6pbf b and e 6< f but
e pbf f. This implies that our concept is really unrelated to direct dominance and
Chwe’s indirect dominance. It is acceptable since our deﬁnition is based on believability
between coalitions. It is easy to prove
Proposition 3.7 Let   = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;) be a coalitional game in ef-
fectiveness form. Let a;b 2 Z such that no y 2 Z a  y. Then, b  a () b pbf a.
11Table 3: WPBF dominances
a 6wpbf a b 6wpbf b c 6wpbf c d 6wpbf d e 6wpbf e f 6wpbf f g 6wpbf g
a 6wpbf b b wpbf c c wpbf d d 6wpbf e e wpbf f f wpbf g g 6wpbf a
a 6wpbf c b wpbf d c 6wpbf e d 6wpbf f e wpbf g f 6wpbf a g 6wpbf b
a 6wpbf d b 6wpbf e c 6wpbf f d 6wpbf g e 6wpbf a f 6wpbf b g 6wpbf c
a 6wpbf e b 6wpbf f c 6wpbf g d 6wpbf a e 6wpbf b f 6wpbf c g 6wpbf d
a 6wpbf f b 6wpbf g c 6wpbf a d 6wpbf b e 6wpbf c f 6wpbf d g 6wpbf e
a 6wpbf g b 6wpbf a c 6wpbf b d 6wpbf c e 6wpbf d f 6wpbf e g 6wpbf f
4 -Stable Sets
In this section, we deﬁne new concepts of stability in coalitional games in effectiveness
form based on dominance relations in Section 5.2, by taking into account drawbacks
shown in Examples 2.2, 2.3. In this framework, we set a convex coefﬁcient i 2 [0;1]
through which any player i expects his value in front of other two possible credible
outcomes a;b 2 Z as a convex combination (1   i)Vi(a) + i Vi(b), whatever the
outcome he is at. If player i lies on c such that Vi(c) < Vi(a) < Vi(b), his expected
payoff is higher than the value in c; if player i lies on c such that Vi(a) < Vi(b) < Vi(c),
his expected payoff is lesser than the value in c; if player i lies on c such that Vi(a) <
Vi(c) < Vi(b), his expected payoff could be higher or lesser than the value in c. The last
issue depends on his evaluation coefﬁcient i. In this construction, we assume that this
coefﬁcient does not depend on Z but only on player i. Associating such a coefﬁcient to
any player does not involve any idea of agreement between players or coalitions; but, it
makes more realistic any strategy by players and, successively, by coalitions which can
enforce some outcomes. So, any coalitional game can be considered added by a vector
 = (i)i=1;:::N which takes into account the safety/risk level of any player participating
in a move of a coalition. According to this idea, we introduce the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (-PBF Stability) A subset Y  Z is path-believable farsightedly sta-
ble if for any a 2 Y 8S;d such that a !S d, we have that 8e such that d pbf e 2 Y
9 i 2 S Vi(a)  (1   i) min
b2Bd;e
Vi(b) + i max
b2Bd;e
Vi(b); (4.1)
9 i 2 S Vi(a)  Vi(d) or if no outcome e 2 Y is such that d pbf e and d 2 Y ; or
no outcome e 2 Y is such that d pbf e and d 62 Y . The subset Bd;e is the collection of
any Bm 1 with m the minimum length of any chain through which d pbf e, Bm 1 the
last subset of any minimal length chains starting from e as described in Deﬁnition 3.1.
12The last subset Bd;e is named the set of ﬁnal outcomes for any element (d;e) belonging
to pbf.
Suppose that a coalition S moves from a to d. Let Y be a path-believable farsightedly
stable set. Let e be any outcome such that d pbf e 2 Y . If i = 0 for some player
i 2 S, player i evaluates only the minimum value that he receives in any outcome in
Bd;e. If the value received in a is greater than the minimum of the values received for
any outcome in Bd;e, he prefers to remain at a. So, a 2 Y . If i = 1 for some player
i 2 S, he evaluates only the maximum value that he receives in any outcome in Bd;e.
If the value received in a is greater or equal than the maximum value received for any
outcome in Bd;e, he prefers to remain at a. So, a 2 Y . Note that such a player i can
receive a minimum value for some outcome in Bm 1 lesser than he receives in a and
a maximum value for some outcome in Bd;e greater than he receives in a. But, if his
evaluation coefﬁcient i is such that his expected return is lesser or equal than his payoff
in a, then player i does not move from a. So, a 2 Y . In addition, if the subset Bd;e is
reduced to a singleton, then the maximum value coincides to minimum one. Therefore,
player i is not involved in setting his evaluation coefﬁcient i. According to the different
ideas of dominance relations, we construct associated notions of stability.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (-WPBF-PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF Stability)
A subset Y  Z is weak path-believable farsightedly stable ( weak path-believable
farsightedlystable, largepath-believablefarsightedlystable, largeweakpath-believable
farsightedly stable, large weak path-believable farsightedly stable ) if for any a 2 Y
8S;d we have that 8e such that d wpbf e 2 Y (d wpbf e 2 Y , d lpbf e 2 Y ,
d lwpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y )
9 i 2 S Vi(a)  (1   i) min
b2Bd;e
Vi(b) + i max
b2Bd;e
Vi(b); (4.2)
9 i 2 S Vi(a)  Vi(d) if no outcome e 2 Y is such that d wpbf e (d wpbf e 2 Y ,
d lpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y ) and d 2 Y ; or no outcome
e 2 Y is such that d wpbf e (d wpbf e 2 Y , d lpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y ,
d lwpbf e 2 Y ) and d 62 Y . The subset Bd;e is the collection of any Bm 1 with
m the minimum length of any chain through which d wpbf e (d wpbf e 2 Y ,
d lpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y , d lwpbf e 2 Y ), Bm 1 the last subset of any
minimal length chains starting from e as described in Deﬁnition 3.1. The last subset
Bd;e is named the set of ﬁnal outcomes for any element (d;e).
We give a particular class of stable sets.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Main -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF Stable Sets)
Wesaythatany-PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF,-LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBFstabilitysetisamain
13-PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set 2 if and only if V is so con-
structed in one of these alternative situations:
 Step 1
Take any outcome in Z and check (4.1), (4.2). Then,
V = Z if Z is stable:
 Step 2
Suppose this is not true. Collect all the outcomes not stable in X in a subset E.
We can say that XnE is a stable set. Take z 2 E. Check if (ZnE)[fzg is stable.
If it is not stable, cut z; otherwise, throw z in  E  E. Repeat this procedure for
all elements in E. Finally, we have a subset  E  E. So,
V = Z n E if  E = ;:
 Step 3
If  E 6= ;, let z 2  E be. Take any element Az 2 P(  E) n f  Eg such that z 2 Az.
Consider all the subsets Az such that (X n E) [ Az is stable. This family Az is
totally ordered with respect to inclusion relation; so, take the maximal element
 Az. Repeat this argument for all z 2  E. Therefore, we have a subset  E such that
to any element in  E it is associated a subset  Az   E such that z 2  Az. Select all
the maximal H 2 P(  E) such that
x 2 \z2H  Az 8x 2 H:
Finally,
V = (Z n E) [ H:
Proposition 4.4 A main -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set is
a -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set.
Remark 4.5 Ingeneral, main-PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF,-LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBFstable
sets does not admit the largest main stable set. In fact, let be the simple following








In this example, fag;fbg are two main PBF stable sets. But fa;bg is not a main stable
set but it is the largest consistent set.
2In the following three steps, we use the term stable as -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-
LWPBF stable.
14In Example 2.1, the main 0-PBF stable set is unique and coincides with fa;d;gg.
In addition, it is externally stable since b pbf d, c pbf d, e pbf g and f pbf g.
Moreover, it is internally stable with respect to PBF dominance since any element in the
main 0-PBF stable set is not dominated with respect to bpf. Note that the main 0-PBF
stable set is not externally stable with respect to  since b 62 fa;d;gg is only dominated
by c;e 62 fa;d;gg. Note that b 62 fa;d;gg. If player 2, starting from b, is endowed by
the same common-sense behaviour described in Example 2.1, player 2 predicts e as a
ﬁnal outcome which prescribes him to move from b. Therefore, it would seem that our
deﬁnition gets this common-sense behaviour.
5 Properties on -Stable Sets
In this section, we study some relationships between our concept of stability and inter-
nally stable sets with respect to <, uncovered set with respect to pbf, exernally stable
sets with respect to pbf. First, our stable sets do not imply internal stability with re-
spect to < as shown by Proposition 5.1. In fact, the main 0-PBF stable set is unique and
coincides with fa;d;gg which is not internally stable.
Proposition 5.1 In Example 2.1, a stable set with respect to  does not exist. In addi-
tion, fa;c;e;gg is a stable set with respect to <.
Proof. LetV beastablesetwithrespectto. But, weprovethatV hasacardinality
of [7
2]+1 = 4 at least. Let D(z) be the set of all outcomes dominating z with respect to
. g 2 V since D(z) = ; If e 2 V , then fe;gg  V . But V is is not internally stable
since g 2 D(e). But, D(d) = feg then d 2 V . So, e 62 V but d;g 2 V . In addition,
D(a) = fbg, D(b) = fc;eg, D(c) = fd;eg, D(f) = fgg. Since e 62 V , there is no
case some different outcomes in CZ(V )nfeg are dominated by the same outcome in V .
Then jCZ(V ) n fegj  [7 3
2 ] = 2. So, jCZ(V )j  3 < 4. Then, jV j  4.
V is internally stable with respect to ; then, it is internally stable set with respect
to < 3. But, we claim that any internally stable set with respect to < has a cardinality of
[7
2] + 1 = 4 at the most as shown in the second row of Table 2. Then, jV j  4. Finally,
jV j = 4.
The only internally stable sets with respect to < whose cardinality is 4 are fa;c;e;gg
and fa;c;e;fg. But, fa;c;e;gg fa;c;e;fg are not internally stable with respect to 
since D(e) = fgg and e 2 D(c), respectively. This means that any stable set with
respect to  does not exist. By simple computations, the unique stable set with respect
to < is fa;c;e;gg. 
3Any internally stable set with respect to  is internally stable set with respect to <. Any externally
stable set with respect to < is externally stable set with respect to .
15We say that ! is a function as functional relation (i.e. there exists some coalition
T such that a !T b). We denote by ! 1 the inverse multifunction of !. Then, the
following proposition holds.
Theorem 5.2 Let   = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;) be a coalitional game in effec-
tiveness form. Let V be -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set.
Suppose
1. 8a;b 2 V; a pbf b : [iSi  S0 where Si are such that !
 1
Si (a) \ V 6= ; and
S0 is the ﬁrst coalition in the chain between a;b as prescribed in Deﬁnition 3.1.
Then, V is internally stable with respect to <.
Proof. Suppose V an -PBF stable set without loosing generality. Let a;a
0 2 V be.
There exists S a coalition such that a !S a
0. Suppose that D(a
0) = fe 2 V ja
0 pbf
eg 6= ;. Let e 2 D(a
0),Ba
0;e be the set of ﬁnal outcomes along the path between a
0;e of
minimal lenght. Then,
9i 2 S Vi(a)  (1   i) min
b2B
a0;e




since a 2 V . But, a
0 pbf e. This implies that there exist a chain starting from a
0 to e.
This implies a coalition S0 , a








Vi(b) 8i 2 S0: (5.2)
By condition 1, i 2 S  S0. From (5.1),(5.2), a S a
0 is not true. By condition 1, by
arbitrariety of a;S, a < a
0 is not true. Suppose that D(a
0) = ;. Then, Vi(a
0)  Vi(a)
for some i 2 S since a;a
0 2 V . Then a <S a
0 is not true. By arbitrariety of a;a
0
a
0 <S a is not true. 
We say that effectiveness relation is acyclic if there exists a;b 2 Z such that !
(a) = ;, ! 1 (b) = ;. We say that effectiveness relation is monotonic if a !S b,
b !T c for some a;b;c 2 Z, for some coalitions S;T implies S  T. We say that that
effectiveness relation is antisymmetric if a !S b implies b !T a.
Corollary 5.3 Let   = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;) be a coalitional game in effec-
tiveness form. Let V be -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set.
Suppose that ! is a monotonic acyclic antisymmetric function. Let K be V-M core.







16These results are useful necessary conditions of -PBF,-WPBF,-WPBF, -LPBF,-
LWPBF,-LWPBF stable set. The uncovered set is the set of maximal elements with
respect to our dominances.
Theorem 5.4 Letbeacoalitionalgameineffectivenessform  = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;)
be a coalitional game in effectiveness form. Suppose UC 6= ;. Suppose
1. !  pbf (wpbf;wpbf)
2. Suppose (a;d) 2!. Let e be such that a;d pbf e (a;d wpbf e a;d wpbf
e). If Ba;e 6= Bd;e then fa 2 Z : a  b b 2 Ba;eg  Bd;e.
3. Suppose (a;d) 2!S for some coalition S. Let e be such that d pbf e. Then,
S   S such that ! S (z) 6= ; 8z 2 Bd;e.




0 -PBF,(-WPBF,-WPBF) stable set for any 
0  .
Proof. Take an element a 2 UC. Suppose that ! (a) 6= ;. Consider a deviation d from
a thorugh a coalition S. So, there are two alternatives: D(d) = fe 2 V jd pbf eg = ;
or not. Let the ﬁrst case be true. By 1, a pbf d. But, no outcome dominates d with
respecttopbf. Itmeansthata < d. Bycoverrelation’sdeﬁnition, itmeansthata <c d.
Then a 62 UC. This is an absurd. Suppose that D(d) = fe 2 V jd pbf eg 6= ;. Take
any element e 2 D(d). So, a pbf d and d pbf e. This implies that a 6pbf e since
a 2 UC. Then, compute Ba;e along the paths of minimal length between a;e. So,
9b 2 Ba;e; i 2 S Vi(a)  Vi(b):
By 2, there exists b 2 Bd;e such that b  b, ! S (b) 6= ; for some coalition S. This
implies










Vi(z)  0; b 2 Bd;e is not a singleton
(i;b) = 1 b 2 Bd;e is a singleton
be for d;e 2 Z;d pbf e. Then, by 3, i 2 S  S (depending on b) such that







17Take  = min(i;b;d;e)  0, then
Vi(a)  (1   ) min
b2Bd;e
Vi(b) +  max
b2Bd;e
Vi(b):
Suppose !m (a) = ;. 4 Then, a is in any V -PBF stable set. 
The hypothesis 2 is a kind of backwards-decreasing property on the set of ﬁnal out-
comes along the paths of a game with respect to inclusion. As corollary of Proposition
3.7, we have
Corollary 5.5 Let   = (N;Z;figi2N;f!SgSN;S6=;) be a coalitional game in effec-
tiveness form. The core with respect to  is externally stable with respect to  ()
the core with respect to pbf is externally stable with respect to pbf.
6 Applications to Prisoner’s Dilemma
A normal form game is a triple G = fN;Zi;uig where N is the set of players, Zi is the
nonempty set of strategies and ui : Z :=
QN
i=1 Zi are utility functions for every player
i 2 N. The traditional stability solution concepts are strong Nash equilibria,  core, 
core in [1] [2],[3]; other solutions in [12] [11], [18]. We recall how a game in normal
form can be seen as a game in effectiveness form. Each individual, facing a proposed
strategy proﬁle c 2 Z, can declare: ”If you all other players stick to play CNnfig, I will
play di 2 Zi instead of ci. ” Each player can make such contingent threats in turn.
Players can revise their threats: no one is committed to anything. Let a;b 2 Z, we say
that a i b if and only if ui(a) < ui(b); we say that a
i ! b if and only if aj = bj for all
j 2 N. If coalitions can form, we say that a S b if and only if ui(a) < ui(b) for all
i 2 S; we say that a
S ! b if and only if aj = bj for all j 2 N n S.
Studies about normal form game played in such a way can be found in [8], [10] and
[15]. For instance, according to rules above, the prisoner’s dilemma can be represented
4If no movement from a is allowed, then a cannot be dominated by any element x 2 Z with respect
to pbf. This implies that a cannot be dominated by any element x 2 Z with respect to cover relation
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Table 4: Direct and indirect Dominances
a 6 a b < a c < a d 6 a
a 6 b b 6 b c 6 b d < b
a 6 c b 6 c c 6 c d < c
a 6 d b 6 d c 6 d d 6 d
Table 5: PBF Dominances
a 6pbf a b pbf a c pbf a d 6pbf a
a 6pbf b b pbf b c 6pbf b d 6pbf b
a 6pbf c b 6pbf c c pbf c d 6pbf c
a 6pbf d b 6pbf d c 6pbfd d pbf d
Table 6: Final outcomes for PBF Dominances
; fag fag ;
; fag ; ;
; ; fag ;
; ; ; ;
Tables regarding WPBF, WPBF, LPBF, LWPBF, LWPBF dominances are equal to
Tables 5,6.
19Proposition 6.1 The unique stable set with respect to indirect dominance (or direct
one) is fa;dg in prisoner’s dilemma played by individual contingent threats.
Proposition 6.2 The largest consistent set is fa;dg in prisoner’s dilemma played by
individual contingent threats.
Proof. [A sketch of the proof] Suppose that players 1 and 2 deviate from a to b and
c, respectively. But b is not consistent with a. In fact, b
2 ! a and the set of outcomes
dominating a is empty. But b 2 a. So, b is unstable. The same argument can be used
for c by taking a deviation to a through player 1. So, the outcome a cannot be consistent
in terms of stability with b and c. But the only outcome dominating b or c is a. So, a is
stable being consistent with itself. 
Proposition 6.3 The main -PBF, -WPBF, -WPBF, -LBF, -LWPB, LWPBF stable set
for any  2 [0;1] is unique and coincides with fa;dg in prisoner’s dilemma played by
individual contingent threats.
The interesting note is that our concept of stability incorporates the outcome d which
is the ”cooperative” solution of the game without letting formation of coalitions possi-
ble. The unique stable set generated by all three dominances is fa;dg. We can say
that the so called cooperative solution is a farsighted solution in a setting in which any
player acts by itself.
We suppose that prisoner’s dilemma is played by Greenberg’s coalitional contingent
situation threats in [10]. Not only each individual but each coalition S facing a proposed
strategy proﬁle can declare: ”If all you other players stick to play zNnS, we will play
dS 2 ZS instead of cS”.
a
(1;1)



























All the arrows in the following graph are labelled by coalition f1;2g. In this case,
we suppose that all the rules prescribed by two graphs above are true. The reader has
to superimpose two graphs above for reading all the possible effectiveness relations be-
tween outcomes. Every dominance with respect (L)BPF, (L)WBPF, (L)WBPF relation
between two outcomes generates a subset of ﬁnal outcomes according to previous def-
initions. We compute direct and indirect dominance, (L)BPF dominances, (L)WBPF
20dominances (L)WBPF dominances and their ﬁnal outcomes. For instance, b pbf a in
Table 8; the subset of ﬁnal outcomes generated by b pbf a is at the same entry in Table
9. The same reading scheme is used in the construction of Tables 10 and 11, Tables 12
and 13.
Table 7: Direct and Indirect Dominances
a 6 a b < a c < a d 6 a
a 6 b b 6 b c 6 b d < b
a 6 c b 6 c c 6 c d < c
a < d b  d c  d d 6 d
Table 8: (L)PBF Dominances
a pbf a b pbf a c pbf a d 6pbf a
a 6pbf b b pbf b c 6pbf b d 6pbf b
a 6pbf c b 6pbf c c pbf c d 6pbf c
a 6pbf d b 6pbf d c 6pbf d d 6pbf d
Table 9: Final outcomes for (L)BPF Dominances
fdg fdg fdg ;
; fa;dg ; ;
; ; fa;dg ;
; ; ; ;
Proposition 6.4 The unique stable set with respect to  is fdg in prisoner’s dilemma
played by coalitional contingent threats. A stable set with respect to < does not exist in
prisoner’s dilemma played by coalitional contingent threats.
Proof. Let V be a stable set with respect to . Suppose that d 62 V , So, by external
stability of V , b 2 V or c 2 V . But, b 2 V or c 2 V implies a 62 V by internal stability.
But, if a 62 V there exists no outcome dominating a which is in V since d 62 V . But
this is a contradiction since V is externally stable. This means that d 2 V . V can not
21Table 10: (L)WPBF Dominances
a wpbf a b wpbf a c wpbf a d wpbf a
a wpbf b b wpbf b c wpbf b d wpbf b
a wpbf c b wpbf c c wpbf c d wpbf c
a 6wpbf d b 6wpbf d c 6wpbf d d wpbf d
Table 11: Final outcomes for (L)WPBF Dominances
fdg fdg fdg fb;cg
fa;dg fa;dg fb;c;dg fa;dg
fa;dg fb;c;dg fa;dg fa;dg
; ; ; fb;cg
include any other outcome distinct from d since a  d;b  d;c  d. Then, V = fdg
which is stable with respect to .
Let V be a stable set with respect to <. Suppose that d 62 V , So, by external stability
of V , b 2 V or c 2 V . But, b 2 V or c 2 V implies a 62 V by internal stability. But, if
a 62 V there exists no outcome dominating a which are in V since d 62 V . But this is a
contradiction since V is externally stable. This means that d 2 V . V has to include b;c
since no other outcome dominates b or c in a direct way except for a 62 V . So, b 2 V
or c 2 V . But, it is an absurd because d  b or d  c. Then, V = fdg. But, it is not
externally stable. Then V does not exist. 
Proposition 6.5 Thelargestconsistentsetisfdginprisoner’sdilemmaplayedbycoali-
tional contingent threats.
Proof. [A sketch of proof] Suppose that players 2 or coalition f1,2g deviate from a to
b, respectively. But b is not consistent with a. In fact, b
2 ! a but b 2 a. The set of
outcomes dominating a consists in d. But, b 2 d. So, b is unstable. So, the outcome
a cannot be consistent in terms of stability with b. But the only outcomes dominating b
are a, d. So, a is stable being consistent with itself notwithstanding any initial deviator
from a (i.e. f1g or f1;2g) is better in d than a. The same argument can be used for c by
taking a deviation to a through player 1 or coalition f1;2g.
In this case, only the coalition f1;2g can take a deviation from a to d. But, d  b
and d  c. player 1 is better in a than c and player 2 is better in a than b. So, there exists
at least one player belonging to the initial deviators who prefers the initial outcome to
the ending ones. This is wrong!!! In fact, b and c are not stable outcomes. So, a becomes
unstable. 
22Table 12: (L)WPBF Dominances
a wpbf a b wpbf a c wpbf a d wpbf a
a wpbf b b wpbf b c wpbf b d 6wpbf b
a wpbf c b wpbf c c wpbf c d 6wpbf c
a 6wpbf d b 6wpbf d c 6wpbf d d wpbf d
Table 13: Final outcomes for (L)W PBF Dominances
fdg fdg fdg fb;cg
fdg fa;dg fbg ;
fdg fcg fa;dg ;
; ; ; fb;cg
Proposition 6.6 Thestablesetwithrespecttopbf doesnotexistinprisoner’sdilemma
played by coalitional contingent threats.
Proof. Suppose that there exist a stable set V with respect to pbf. The outcomes a, b,
c can not belong to V by internal stability since they are dominated by themselves with
respect to pbf. So, suppose that V = fdg since d 6pbf d. But, c 62 V and c 6pbf d.
Therefore, fdg is not externally stable. Finally, this a contradiction. 
Proposition 6.7 Thestablesetwithrespecttowpbf doesnotexistinprisoner’sdilemma
played by coalitional contingent threats.
Proposition 6.8 The stable set with respect to wpbf does not exist in prisoner’s
dilemma played by coalitional contingent threats.
Let R,R
0 and V ,V
0 be two relations on Z and their relative VNM stable sets, respec-
tively. If R  R
0 does not imply that V  V
0. So, neither Proposition 6.7 does not
imply Proposition 6.6 according to pbfwpbf nor Proposition 6.8 does not imply
Proposition 6.7 according to wpbfwpbf.
In addition, prisoner’s dilemma played by coalitional contingent threats satisﬁes
hypotheses of Corollary ??. So, a main -(L)PBF stability set is not fa;dg since it
is not internally stable with respect to <.
Proposition 6.9 In prisoner’s dilemma played by coalitional contingent threats, the
main -(L)PBF stability set is unique and coincides with fdg for any  2 [0;1]; the
main -(L)WPBF stability set is unique and coincides with fdg for any  2 [0; 4
5]2; the
main -(L)WPBF stability set is unique and coincides with an ; for any  2]4
5;1]2; the
main -(L)WPBF stability set is unique and coincides with fdg for any  2 [0;1].
237 Some ﬁnal considerations
Some objections to this idea could be found in our deﬁnitions. We suppose that the
ﬁrst deviator can consider that the intermediate coalitions are farsighted as him. But
this deﬁnition suffers from the fact that the intermediate coalitions, in their turn, could
consider their intermediate coalitions, leading themselves to ending ﬁnal outcome, not
so farsighted. So, this objection is strong. If the last thing were true, we should be
upset in computing our dominances between two outcomes: or, better, it would need
to know other dominances between other outcomes for computing dominances between
two ﬁxed outcomes and viceversa. So, this could imply an implicit deﬁnition. There-
fore, we suppose a ﬁrst degree of knowledge. Thinking of inﬁnite processes on ratio-
nalizability for all coalitions, moving by a belief of moves of other coalitions who, in
its turn, move by a belief of moves of other moving coalitions and so on, is an hard
problem. Our dominance’s concept takes into account the length of path joining two
outcomes instead of Chwe’s deﬁnition. We propose some questions for a interested
reader. In Section 4, if does the  vector depend on Z what could happen in terms of
stability results? In the case Z is a subset of R or in the case of a countable inﬁnite
number of players, does  need to have some good property for making our stability
sets not empty? If yes, what kind of properties? In Section 4, how can we construct
different concept of stability sets by not choosing paths of minimal length in Deﬁnitions
4.1, 4.2? In this case, can we suppose that dominance prescribes paths of same length
for reaching ﬁnal outcomes? Can we interpreter the last assumption as a same length
farsightedness degree for all coalitions?
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